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Most previous studies that developed Mortgage-backed Securities (MBS) 
models focused on investors, but the model that is presented here is 
specifically for MBS issuers.  I developed a risk management tool for issuers 
and guarantors to monitor their MBS portfolios.  The model projects the cash 
inflow of mortgages and the cash outflow to MBS; alters the traditional model 
by introducing decision trees; combines the prepayment, delinquency, default, 
and recovery of delinquency into a single model; and uses a simulation 
program with multiple path generation to develop a model for issuers to 
manage their MBS portfolios.  According to the results of the model, issuers 
can manage the risk level of their portfolios by determining the Collection 
Account Balance, the Overcollateralization Ratio, the Net Residual Value, 
and the Liquidity Advance.  The final part of this paper provides suggestions 
on risk management for MBS issuers. 
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The market for mortgage-backed securities (MBS) has experienced more 
rapid growth in size and complexity than any other fixed-income market in 
recent years.  Since the earliest MBS transaction of the Government 
National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) in early 1970s, various MBS 
have been issued by quasi-government agencies such as the Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) and the Federal National 
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), or by private agencies and investment 
banks.   
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Nowadays, capital markets are looking for more complicated innovations in 
MBS products, such as collateralized mortgage obligation (CMO) and 
multiclass MBS.  Numerous studies have been conducted into these 
complicated MBS, including those of prepayment analysis, delinquency 
management, and valuation models.  Although countless studies have 
developed MBS, most of them have been written from the angle of MBS 
investors, and only a limited number have focused on MBS issuers.  
 
The concerns of MBS issuers are completely different from those of MBS 
investors.  The principal objective of MBS investors is to obtain the 
principal and interest return with a good balance between risk and reward 
expectations.  As the cash flow of MBS depends on the prepayment rate of 
underlying mortgages, the amount and timing of monthly principal and 
interest payments is the focus of investors.  In most situations, the concerns 
of investors arise from uncertain factors, such as the prepayment risk of 
mortgages, the structural risk of the MBS, and the credit risk of the issuers 
and guarantors, etc.   
 
In contrast, the concerns of MBS issuers and guarantors are different from 
those of investors.  Except for the plain vanilla with a simple pass-through 
structure, most MBS in current market are complicated CMOs with multi-
class bonds.  The principal and interest payments of CMOs are supported by 
the cash inflow of the underlying mortgages, and the cash outflows to 
investors are usually guaranteed by the issuers or the guarantee agency.  As 
the issuers need to redistribute the cash inflow from a mortgage pool to a 
series of bond classes with different principals and maturities, the spirit of 
their risk management should focus on the mismatch between the cash 
flows of mortgages and the MBS.  Moreover, the possibility of losing 
money from the guarantee of principal and interest payments in the selected 
MBS pools is a concern.  
 
As in all other types of business, issuers face risks on the first day placing 
MBS in the market.  MBS issuers face three basic types of risk, namely 
reinvestment risk, cash flow mismatch between the mortgage pool and the 
MBS, and the potential loss of subordinate MBS.  When the prepayment 
rate is high, the excess cash that is received from the mortgage pool suffers 
a lower return rate than does the coupon rate of mortgages.  After the 
prepayment principal is received from the underlying mortgage pool, the 
issuers may receive more money than expected, and thus create the 
reinvestment risk.  The cash flow mismatch between the mortgage pool and 
the MBS will be occurred if the issuers cannot predict the embedded 
options of mortgage loans accurately.  For potential loss of subordinate 
MBS, the issuers will absorb the cash flow shortfalls that are caused by A Risk Management Model for MBS Issuers 171 
 
default-related losses with respect to the senior tranches when the quality of 
the mortgages is poor. 
 
Many existing models of mortgages and MBS adopt the arbitrage principle 
of option pricing theory (i.e. they consider a mortgage as a bond with 
prepayment, delinquency, and default options).  Keenan, Muller, and 
Epperson (1993) adopted the traditional approach, but modified it with a 
decision tree to define prepayment and delinquency probability.  Ambrose, 
Buttimer, and Capone (1997) explored the time delay between delinquency 
and default, and the chance that the mortgage might recover under the 
delinquency state, both of which are not considered by most studies.  
 
My model is a blend of those from previous studies, with extensions.  The 
objective of this paper is to develop a risk management tool for issuers and 
guarantors to monitor their MBS portfolios.  I adopt a similar approach to 
previous studies, but use a simulation program to generate the random paths 
on the uncertainty.  I will generate different paths of cash flow scenarios 
through computer programs, and for each cash flow will generate the whole 
cash flows with pre-defined variables. 
 
Another feature of the model is that it combines the prepayment, 
delinquency, default, and recovery of delinquency into a single model.   
Many previous mortgage and MBS models treated prepayment and default 
in discrete models.  Yet, according to the discussion of Deng, Quigley, and 
Van Order (2000), the simultaneity of these options is important in 
explaining mortgage behavior.  Factors that trigger an option are important 
in triggering or preceding the exercise of another option, and we should 
treat all the options together.  Without amalgamating the effect of all 
options, we cannot precisely predict the mortgage behavior to furnish a 
complete and comprehensive model. 
 
The traditional method of mortgage pricing calculation projects the simple 
cash flow, which may not be accurate enough to determine the MBS pricing.  
The model that is developed in this paper projects the cash flow for both 
sides of MBS (i.e. the cash inflow from the mortgage pool and the cash 
outflow to the MBS portfolio).  The model will identify the potential loss of 
guarantee payment and the reinvestment risk on excess cash flow.  The 
model is based on the structuring model of the Korea Mortgage Corporation 
(KoMoCo), and seven MBS from 2000-1 to 2001-2 are tested.  By 
exploiting the development of the structuring model for KoMoCo, the 
model is appropriated for issuers to manage the risk elements of their MBS 
portfolios. 172 Lam 
   
FACTORS IN PROJECTING THE MORTGAGE CASH 
FLOW 
 
As stated in the previous section, whether MBS issuers can accurately 
project the cash flow of mortgage portfolios is particularly important in 
terms of risk management.  The following are the key factors in projecting 




Prepayment is a critical factor for evaluating the performance and risk 
management of MBS.  When the mortgage is prepaid, the prepayments of 
principal significantly alter the cash flow that is received from the principal 
and interest of the mortgage pool.  If mortgages are prepaid when the 
interest rate trend is going down, then the funds that are received from 
prepaid loans will attain a lower reinvestment rate than their original 
mortgage contract rate.  Therefore, investors and issuers suffer reinvestment 
losses by forgoing the opportunity to earn the high interest income from the 
original contract. 
 
Delinquency and Default 
 
Delinquency and default also affect the cash flow of the mortgage portfolio.  
Unlike prepayment, delinquency and default may take several months to 
complete.  Therefore, we need to consider the whole process flow in cash 
flow management, such as the time gap between delinquency and 
liquidation, the cure speed table, and the loss severity that is equal to the 
percentage of loss on the defaulted loan balance by the lender.  When the 
liquidation collection minus transaction costs is less than the outstanding 
balance of the mortgage, the lender will suffer a loss that is equal to the 
multiple of the defaulted balance to the loss severity. 
 
Recovery of delinquency and cure speed 
 
In real life situations, only a small percentage of delinquent loans default, 
while the majority are recovered to the normal state.  One of the common 
approaches to describing the recovery of delinquency for mortgages is the 
determination of the “cure speed” (i.e. the rate of recovery of a delinquent 
mortgage to the normal state).  With the figures of the cure speed table, one 
can determine the ratio of the pool to proceed to (i+1) months delinquency 
and recover to the normal state in the status of i month delinquency. 
 




Various previous studies explored the embedded options of mortgages, but 
most of them explored the option separately and did not combine the 
prepayment, delinquency, default, and recovery of delinquency into a single 
model.  My model attempts to combine all of these factors, because they are 
interrelated.  For example, when the prepayment option is exercised, the 
default option becomes ineffective.  Similarly, when the delinquency option 
is exercised, the probability of exercising the default option will increase 
with the length of delinquency.  
 
The primary scenario begins with the simplest cases of mortgage payment 
without embedded options (i.e. all mortgages follow the normal schedule 
installment until maturity).  A distinct schedule can be calculated through a 
simple formula that includes the original balance and the interest rate and 
maturity of each individual loan, and then can be aggregated to form the 
cash flow of the whole mortgage pool. 
 
The subsequent task is to incorporate the embedded options into the 
analysis.  When the embedded option is exercised, the cash flow of the 
mortgage is affected, and has a shorter maturity than originally expected.  
The model links the property price H(i), interest rate r(i), prepayment 
probability  π (r,H,i), delinquency function λ(r,H,i), and default function 
δ(r,H,i) to build the picture of the scheduled cash flow.  I will develop a 
Monte Carlo simulation program to generate the cash flow of a single 
mortgage, and use it to determine the cash flow of all the mortgages 
 
Finally, the projection of cash inflow from mortgages will be combined 
with the cash outflow of the MBS, as shown in Fig. 2.  The model includes 
other factors of the cash flow such as the call option of issuers and the 
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Figure 1: Cash Flow Projection of Mortgages 
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THE MODEL 
 
The following notation will be used in the model: 
 
i    = the number of installment payments 
t(i)    = the date of the ith monthly payment  
  
Interest Rate 
r(i)    = the interest rate function  
im(i)    = the contract rate of mortgage  
id(i)    = the delinquency interest rate  
ir(i)    = the reinvestment rate from period i to i+1 
ib(i)    = the borrowing rate from period i to i+1 
 
Conditional Probability of Prepayment, Delinquency, and Default 
(r,H,i)    = the conditional probability of prepayment 
(r,H,i)     = the conditional probability of delinquency 
(r,H,i,j)    = the Cure Speed rate at the jth payment which occurs at 
  the  ith  payment 
(r,H,i,j)    = the conditional probability of default at the jth payment 
    which occurs at the ith payment 
 
Original Cash Flow (the cash flow of the mortgage without considering 
prepayment, delinquency, and default) 
Po(i)  = the original schedule of principal payment 
Io(i)  = the original schedule of interest payment 
PIo(i)  = the original schedule of principal + interest payment 
Bo(i)  = the original schedule of outstanding balance 
 
Scheduled Cash Flow (the cash flow of mortgage with prepayment, 
delinquency, and default) 
 
Ps(i)    = the schedule of principal payment with prepayment, 
  delinquency, and default 
Is(i)  = the schedule of interest payment with prepayment, 
  delinquency, and default 
PIs(i)  = the schedule of principal + interest payment with 
  prepayment, delinquency, and default 
Bs(i)  = the schedule of outstanding balance with prepayment, 
  delinquency, and default 
 
PPREP(i)   = the prepayment Principal (both full and partial) 
PDLC(i)  = the Delinquency Principal in current period  
PDLT(i)   = the Accumulated Delinquency Principal  A Risk Management Model for MBS Issuers 177 
 
PDLR(i)  = the recovery of delinquency principal according to the 
Cure   Speed 
IDL(i)  = the Delinquency Interest  
PDF(i)  = the Default Principal 
 
Combined Cash Flow of the Mortgage and the MBS 
Ci(i)  = the cash inflow from the mortgage pool in period i 
Co(i)   = the cash outflow to the MBS in period i (the timely  
  payment of principal and interest) 
Cb(i)  = the cash balance in period i 
 
Cash Outflow to MBS 
PSenMBS(i)  = the principal payment to Senior MBS 
ISenMBS(i)  = the interest payment to Senior MBS 
PSubMBS(i)   = the principal payment to Subordinate MBS 
ISubMBS(i)  = the interest payment to Subordinate MBS 
 
Other Variables 
T  = the tenor of the mortgage 
H(i)   = the housing price of the underlying asset    
 
 
Underlying Property Price and Interest Rate 
 
The model follows the assumption of asset price movement as a lognomial 
random walk Brownian motion in the option-pricing model of Black and 
Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973).  The asset price is expressed as a 
lognomial random walk with constant volatility, which is a specific 
category of the Markonian process.  As suggested by Kau (1995), the value 
of the underlying property is assumed to follow the Brownish motion (i.e. 
the change in the process over the next time interval is independent of what 






where  u-b  = the expected rate of housing return 
  H2  = the instantaneous variance of housing return 
  dzH  = the Standard Wiener Process 
 
Interest rate forecasting is important, as interest rates affect the pricing of 
MBS.  Some models assume that the interest rate function is a log-normal 
random walk with a drift that centers the distribution on the implied forward 
H Hdz   b)dt  - (u    
H
dH
σ + =178 Lam 
   
rate.  Similar to the previous assumption on property price, I adopted the 
mean-reverting normal process to define the interest rate r, and the model 





 where  γ  = the speed of adjustment 
        θ  = the long-term value for the interest rate 
  σH
2  = the instantaneous variance of the interest rate 
        dzH  = the Standard Wiener Process 
 
The reinvestment rate ir(i) and borrowing rate ib(i) can be determined 
through this mean-reverting process.  If the mortgage is ARM, then the 
contract interest rate of mortgage r(i) can also be determined through this 
method. 
 
Decision Tree of a mortgage loan 
 
With the embedded options of prepayment, delinquency, and default, we 
can consider the mortgage as a decision tree with different branches of 
decision marking when a particular option is exercised.  For the normal 
state of period i, the borrower can either exercise the prepayment or 
delinquency options, as in the following diagram:  
 
Period i            Period i+1 
 
     N o r m a l  
 
 




     Exercise  the  delinquency 
option  
 
For each transition period from i to i+1, we assume that the mortgage will 
have the probability distribution of: 
 
Normally scheduled payment:    1-π(r,H,i)-λ(r,H,i) 
Prepayment:      π(r,H,i) 
Delinquency:      λ(r,H,i) 
  
dzr r r dt r   + − = δ θ γ ) (   dr 
π(r,H,i) 
λ(r,H,i) 
1-π(r,H,i)-λ(r,H,i) A Risk Management Model for MBS Issuers 179 
 
When the prepayment option is exercised, the cash flow of the mortgage is 
terminated and the lender receives the entire outstanding principal of the 
loan, plus penalty charges and interest if there are any available.   
Alternatively, when the delinquency option is exercised, the mortgage either 
recovers its normal status according to the cure rate, continues the 
delinquency, or turns to default as shown in the following decision tree 
(assuming that the delinquency occurs in period i): 
 
  t(i’)               t(i’+1) 
 
     Continue  the  delinquency 
 
 Delinquency    Recovery  the  delinquency   
  
     Exercise  the  default  option   
 
 
Continue the delinquency:   1-χ(r,h,i,i’+1)- δ(r,h,i,i’+1) 
Recovery with cure speed:   χ(r,h,i,i’+1) 
Default:     δ(r,H,i, i’+1)  
 
When the delinquency continues from period i’ to i’+1, the delinquency 
principal is accumulated with additional delinquency interest.  Of course, 
the borrower can also recover the delinquency by paying all of the unpaid 
delinquency principal to the lender, or by exercising the default option to 
terminate the cash flow of the mortgage. 
 
Schedule of Mortgage Cash Flow without Embedded Options 
 
If the embedded option of prepayment, delinquency, and default is not 
considered, then the amortized schedule and cash flow of the mortgage can 
be determined by the following formula: 
 
(3) 
  Io(i)   = Bo(i-1) x ir(i) x (t(i) - t(i-1))  
  Po(i)   = PIo(i) - Io(i) 
  Bo(i)   = Bo(i-1) - Po(i)  
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When the embedded options of prepayment, delinquency, and default are 
considered, the revised cash flow schedule will be determined as follows: 
 
(i) Prepayment: 
PPREP(i) =  Bs(i-1)  x  π(r,H,i) 
 
 (ii) Delinquency: 
PDLC(i) = Ps(i-1) x λ(r,H,i)  
PDLT(i) = PDLT(i-1) + PDLC(i) - PDLR(i)  












(iv) Scheduled Cash Flow with Embedded Options: 
Ps(i)  = Bs(i-1) x [Po(i)/Bo(i-1)+ π(r,H,i)] –PDLC(i) + PDLR(i) 
Is(i)  = [Bs(i-1) –PDLC(i) –PDF(i)] x [Io(i)/Bo(i-1)] + IDL(i) 
PIs(i)  = Ps(i) + Is(i) 
Bs(i)   = Bs(i-1) – Ps(i) – PDF(i)  
 
Combined Cash Flow with MBS 
 
It is the duty of issuers to provide guarantees of the timely payment of 
principal and interest to the senior portion of the MBS.  As issuers suffer 
losses only when the funds that are received from the mortgage pool (P&I) 
cannot cover the payment of the senior MBS, the guarantee fee should equal 
the expected value of insufficient fund coverage.  According to the common 
practice of the MBS industry, only the principal and interest payment of 
senior MBS are guaranteed by issuers.  Investors in subordinate MBS 
receive the principal and interest payment only when the payment of senior 
MBS is fully settled (i.e. when the cash inflow from the mortgage portfolio 
can satisfy all of the principal and interest payments of the senior MBS, 
when the Collection Account Balance at period i-1, including reinvestment 
or borrowing interest, plus when the Cash inflow in period i is greater than 
the principal and interest payment of the senior MBS). The payment of the 
subordinate MBS is illustrated by the following formula: 
If Cb(i-1) >= 0 (i.e. a positive collection account balance at period i-1): 
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Case 1:  Cb(i-1) (1+ir(i-1)) + Ci(i) – (PSenMBS(i) + ISenMBS(i)) < 0 
  where ir(i-1) = the reinvestment rate from period i-1 to i 
=>  PSubMBS(i) = ISubMBS(i) = 0 
Co(i) = PSenMBS(i) + ISenMBS(i) 
Cb(i) = Cb(i-1) (1+ir(i-1)) + Ci(i) - PSenMBS(i) + ISenMBS(i) 
No payment on the principal and interest of the subordinate MBS.  The 
issuer needs to borrow money to pay the principal and interest of the senior 
MBS. 
 
Case 2:  0  <=  Cb(i-1)(1+ir(i-1))+Ci(i)- (PSenMBS(i)+ISenMBS(i)) < 
PSubMBS(i) + ISubMBS(i) 
=>  PSubMBS(i) + ISubMBS(i) = Cb(i-1)(1+ir(i-1))+Ci(i)-
PSenMBS(i)+ISenMBS(i) 
Co(i) = Cb(i-1) (1+ir(i-1)) + Ci(i) 
Cb(i) = 0 
Only a partial amount of principal and interest will be paid to investors in 
the subordinate MBS.  
 
Case  3:    Cb(i-1) (1+ir(i-1)) + Ci(i) – (PSenMBS(i) + ISenMBS(i)) >= 
PSubMBS(i) + ISubMBS(i) 
=>  Co(i) = PSenMBS(i) + ISenMBS(i) + PSubMBS(i) + ISubMBS(i) 
  Cb(i) = Cb(i-1) (1+ir(i-1)) + Ci(i) - Co(i) 
The full amount of principal and interest will be paid to investors in the 
senior and subordinate MBS.  
 
If Cb(i-1) < 0 (i.e. a negative collection account balance at period i-1): 
 
Case 1:  Cb(i-1) (1+ib(i-1)) + Ci(i) – (PSenMBS(i) + ISenMBS(i)) < 0 
  where ib(i-1) = the borrowing rate from period i-1 to i 
=>  PSubMBS(i) = ISubMBS(i) = 0 
Co(i) = PSenMBS(i) + ISenMBS(i) 
Cb(i) = Cb(i-1) (1+ib(i-1)) + Ci(i) - PSenMBS(i) + ISenMBS(i) 
No payment on the principal and interest of the subordinate MBS.  The 
issuer needs to borrow money to pay the principal and interest of the senior 
MBS. 
 
Case 2:  0  <=  Cb(i-1)(1+ib(i-1))+Ci(i)- (PSenMBS(i)+ISenMBS(i)) < 
PSubMBS(i) + ISubMBS(i) 
=>  PSubMBS(i) + ISubMBS(i) = Cb(i-1)(1+ir(i-1))+Ci(i)-
PSenMBS(i)+ISenMBS(i) 
Co(i) = Cb(i-1) (1+ib(i-1)) + Ci(i) 
Cb(i) = 0 
Only a partial amount of principal and interest will be paid to investors in 
the subordinate MBS.  182 Lam 
   
Case 3:  Cb(i-1)(1+ib(i-1))  +  Ci(i) – (PSenMBS(i) + ISenMBS(i)) >= 
PSubMBS(i) + ISubMBS(i) 
=>  Co(i) = PSenMBS(i) + ISenMBS(i) + PSubMBS(i) + ISubMBS(i) 
  Cb(i) = Cb(i-1) (1+ib(i-1)) + Ci(i) - Co(i) 
The full amount of principal and interest will be paid to investors in the 
senior and subordinate MBS.  
 
According to the calculation in the above model, MBS issuers can consider 
the following important factors when they determine the risk levels of their 
MBS portfolios. 
 
Exercise of MBS Call Options 
 
Issuer’s call options are common in the MBS market.  There are two types 
of call option for MBS issuers: 
 
(i)  a pre-mature call option – the issuer has the right to redeem the 
outstanding bonds under a pre-defined period and condition; and 
 
(ii)  an issuer’s clean-up call – the issuer can fully redeem the 
outstanding notes on any monthly MBS Payment Date, on which the 
outstanding mortgage pool balance is a certain percentage less than the 
initial mortgage pool amount.  In market practice, the issuer’s clean-up call 
is usually set at 10% of the initial mortgage pool amount.  
 
Call options are among the influential tools that issuers use to manage their 
MBS portfolios.  When there is a financial benefit to redeem the MBS, 
issuers will exercise a call option to enhance the return of the total portfolio.  
The call option of KoMoCo papers is the pre-mature option, in which the 
issuer can redeem the paper prior to the maturity date.  The senior MBS are 
callable in the sequence of any coupon payment date, providing that those 
with shorter maturities are fully repaid, and the exercise date is later or 
equal to the legal maturity date of the previous tranche.  The installment 
tranche is callable independently or collectively at any quarterly coupon 
payment date that falls on or after five years.  When the call option is 
exercised, the available cash is distributed to the National Housing Fund at 
any coupon payment date once the Senior MBS are fully prepaid. 
 
The judgment of call option exercise is challenging.  When MBS issuers 
need to decide whether to exercise a call option, they compare the financial 
benefits of both situations with sophisticated forecasting models that 
generate the cash flow projections of both scenarios.  I have developed a 
program with which issuers can compare the difference and determine the 
best decision to enhance their portfolio returns. A Risk Management Model for MBS Issuers 183 
 
Figure 3:  Variables for MBS Risk Measurement 
Factors Variables Measurement   
Collection 
Account Balance 
Cb(i)  Indicates the outstanding cash 






Indicates whether the 
portfolio is in excess or in 
shortage of cash inflow from 
the mortgage pool. 
Net Residual 
Value 
Value of Cb(N) at the 
maturity of the MBS 
If the residual is held by the 
issuer, it will suffer a loss if 
the Net Residual Value is 
negative at the maturity date 
of the MBS. 
Liquidity Advance  The amount of 
borrowing when 
Cb(i)  
The issuer needs to borrow 
money from other sources to 
pay the principal and interest 
of the MBS if the liquidity 







The data for this model was provided by KoMoCo with seven MBS 
portfolios that were issued from 2000-1 to 2002-2.  The data set contains 
350,139 mortgages that were held by the National Housing Fund (NHF), 
except for MBS 2002-1, which is held by Samsung.  For each mortgage, I 
obtained the data of the original outstanding balance, the coupon rate, and 
the maturity date, so that the scheduled balance of the portfolio can be 
calculated.  The file was downloaded from the computer system of 
KoMoCo, and extracted from a personal computer file for analysis. 
 
I also obtained the 3-month CD rate for the past ten years for projecting the 
reinvestment and borrowing rates of the model.  The historical data of 
prepayment, delinquency, default, and cure speed was also available for 
analyzing the function of these embedded options.  I used this data to 
project the cash flow of the mortgage portfolio, and combined it with the 
cash flow of the MBS pool to determine the risk level of the company. 
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Figure 4:  MBS Issued by the Korea Mortgage Corporation 





Senior MBS (Public 
Offering) 
(billion Won) 





    bn (won)  bn (won)  No of 
Tranches 
(Maturity) 






7/4/2000  397.6   369   9  
(6mths~6yr) 
28.6   2 (6yr, 7yr)  82,570 
MBS 
2000-2 
1/9/2000  500   479   11  
 (6mths~7 
½yr) 
21   2  (8yr, 9yr)  103,819 
MBS 
2000-3 
8/12/2000  381.3   368   12  
(6mths~10yr) 
13.3   1  (11.5yr)  58,367 
MBS 
2001-1 
18/5/2001  237.7   228   12  
(6mths~10yr) 
9.7   1  (12yr)  15,633 
MBS 
2001-2 
20/9/2001  505   500   7  (1yr~14yr)  5   1  (15yr)  44,750 
MBS 
2002-1 
23/1/2002  17.97   17.5   3  (1yr~7.5yr)  0.47 billion  1  (15yr)  601 
MBS 
2002-2 
21/2/2002  510.2   492   8  
(0.5yr~14yr) 
18.2   1  (15yr)  44,399 
Total*   2549.77   
(USD 1.98  bn) 
2,453.50 
(USD 1.90 billion) 
96.27 billion won 
(USD 74.62 million) 
350,139 




A comprehensive program has been developed for handling the calculation 
of the mortgage cash flow, the MBS principal and interest payment, the 
balance of the collection account, and the simulation of multiple path 
analysis.  The effects of prepayment, delinquency, default, the reinvestment 
rate, and the loss severity are analyzed with the risk elements of issuers.  
The risk factors of Collection Account Balance, Overcollateralization Ratio, 
Net Residual Value, and Liquidity Advance are determined by the program 
under different scenarios. 
 
In order to weigh up the performance of the program, I imported the 
historical data of KoMoCo to the program, and the result was satisfactory.  
The output of the analysis is highly recognized by KoMoCo.  It allows the 
staff to project the cash flow of their portfolio, and helps them to explore 
the embedded risk of their MBS issues.  For some MBS tranches with 
earlier issue dates, such as MBS 2000-1 to MBS 2000-3, the simulation A Risk Management Model for MBS Issuers 185 
 
result is compared with the actual figures of the years 2001 and 2002, and 
the outcome has confirmed the accuracy of the program.  Since the 
timeframe of the actual figures is only for two years, this comparison may 
not be statistically significant enough to draw any conclusion, and will not 
be discussed in this paper. 
 
Collection Account Balance 
 
Fig. 5 reports the results of projecting the cash flow of the mortgage 
portfolio, the MBS portfolio, and the balance of the collection account on 
the selected portfolio of KoMoCo.  The cash inflow from mortgages is 
received on a monthly basis, and the cash outflow to the MBS for coupon 
interest is quarterly, and the principal is biannual.   
 
Figure 5:  The Simulation Result for the Collection Account Balance 
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Due to the mismatch between the payment sequence of the mortgages and 
the MBS portfolio, the balance of the collection account is in a “jigsaw” 
shape.  This diagram is important to the MBS issuers as it can show: 
 
(i)  the variance between the cash flow of the mortgages and the MBS 
portfolio;  
(ii)  the possibility of liquidity advance (i.e. the balance of the collection 
account being less than zero); 
(iii)  whether the cash inflow from mortgages is enough to pay the cash 
outflow to the MBS; and 
(iv)  the Net Residual Value (i.e. the value of the collection account 
balance at maturity). 
 
Fig. 6 demonstrates the effect of prepayment on the collection account 
balance.  The prepayment rate is determined according to the analysis of 
historical data from the mortgage portfolio of KoMoCo.  The result shows 
that the “jigsaw” shape of the collection account balance will bow upward 
with high prepayment and downward with low prepayment.   
 
Figure 6:  The Collection Account Balance under Different Prepayment 
Rate Scenarios 



































When the prepayment rate is higher than expected, the issuers will receive 
more cash from the mortgage portfolio in the earlier stage so that it will 
create a higher collection account balance in the middle of the period, and a A Risk Management Model for MBS Issuers 187 
 
lesser balance at the later stage.  Given that the return on reinvestment is 
usually lower than the mortgage coupon rate, a high prepayment will 
generate a lower or even negative Net Residual Value. 
 
The Overcollateralization Ratio 
 
Fig. 7 presents the relationship between the prepayment rate and the 
overcollateralization ratio.  Similar to the situation of the collection account 
balance, the overcollateralization ratio will bow upward with high 
prepayment and downward with low prepayment.  When the value of the 
overcollateralization ratio is negative, the balance of the collection account 
will not be sufficient to pay the principal and interest of the MBS. 
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Scenarios
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Net Residual Value 
 
Fig. 8 presents the relationship among the Net Residual Value, the 
prepayment rate, and the reinvestment rate.  The prepayment rate is 
determined according to the analysis of historical data from the mortgage 
portfolio of KoMoCo, and the reinvestment rate is generated by a 
simulation program through the mean-reverting normal process.  The result 
shows that the Net Residual Value increases with the reinvestment rate and 
decreases with the prepayment rate.  
 
In real life situations, the prepayment rate is negatively correlated with the 
reinvestment rate (i.e. the prepayment increases when the reinvestment 
decreases).  When the interest rate falls, borrowers have a good opportunity 188 Lam 
   
to obtain lower mortgage rates than the original contract rate.  Thus, if the 
interest rate trend is going down, then the reinvestment rate will decrease, 
the prepayment rate will increase, and the Net Residual Value will 
significantly diminish. 
 
Figure 8:  The Net Residual Value against the Prepayment and  












Rate x 3  -33,158 -28,101 -22,173 -15,263 -7,250  0 
Base Prep 
Rate x 2  -9,021  -5,374  -1,152  0  0  867 
Base 
Prepayment 
Rate  9,172  10,716 12,451 14,397 16,581 19,031 
Base Prep 
Rate  x  0.5  29,720 29,935 30,106 30,229 30,296 30,301 
No 
Prepayment 53,892 52,484 50,765 48,697 46,240 43,348 
(unit: million Korean Won) 
 
Fig. 9 further presents the relationship among the Net Residual Value, the 
prepayment rate, and the default rate.  When the default rate increases, the 
Net Residual Value decreases.  As the default rate is usually maintained at a 
low level in Korea, the effect of default on the Net Residual Value is not as 
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1.5 Base x 2 Base x 3
Base Prep Rate x 3  -14,917  -15,090 -15,263  -15,436 -15,609  -15,955
Base Prep Rate x 2  0  0 0  0 0  0
Base Prepayment
Rate  15,048 14,723 14,397 14,072 13,746 13,095
Base Prep Rate x
0.5  31,007 30,618 30,229 29,839 29,450 28,671
No  Prepayment  49,637 49,167 48,697 48,227 47,757 46,816




Figs. 10 and 11 report the relationship among the Liquidity Advance, the 
prepayment rate, and the reinvestment rate.  Fig. 10 shows the maximum 
value of the Liquidity Advance, and Fig. 11 shows the aggregate value.  
The results show that the Liquidity Advance and prepayment rate have a 
convex curve relationship (i.e. the curve has a minimum at the base 
situation, and either the increase or decrease in prepayment rate will have a 
higher liquidity advance).  When the prepayment rate increases, the issuers 
will receive more cash at the earlier stage, but a lesser return from 
reinvestment and thus a high liquidity advance at the later stage.  When the 
prepayment rate decreases, the collection account will have an insufficient 
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Figure 10:  The Maximum Liquidity Advance against the Prepayment 









Base Prep Rate x 3  38,159  32,674  26,500  19,568  11,800  3,112 
Base Prep Rate x 2  19,815  16,042  11,823  7,112  1,861  0 
Base Prepayment 
Rate  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Base Prep Rate x 
0.5  19,233 19,422 19,614 19,808 20,005 20,204 
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Base Prep Rate x 
3 828,751 663,303 500,287 327,542 161,719 9,885 
Base Prep Rate x 
2 270,634 179,910 88,836  26,472  2,427  0 
Base Prepayment 
Rate  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Base Prep Rate x 


















This paper has presented a unified model of risk management for MBS 
issuers.  By adopting the structuring model of KoMoCo, I have projected 
the cash inflow from a mortgage pool and the cash outflow of an MBS.  The 
model alters previous efforts through the addition of decision trees and the 
embedded options of prepayment, delinquency, and default in a single and 
consolidated model.  Moreover, the time delay between delinquency and 
default and the probability of recovery under the delinquency state have 
also been considered.  Combining the results of the model with the actual 
data of KoMoCo, I have established a prudent framework for MBS issuers 






































   
 
This paper illustrates several important factors in the management of MBS 
portfolios.  MBS issuers should always: 
 
Sustain a diminutive mismatch between the cash inflow and outflow to 
retain a low balance in the collection account.  If the collection account 
balance is too high, then it will introduce a high reinvestment risk to the 
issuer.  Conversely, if the collection account balance is too low, then it may 
bring about the probability of a liquidity advance. 
 
Maintain their portfolios at an appropriate overcollateralization ratio to 
prevent an immense surplus or shortfall for the payment of the MBS 
principal.  
 
Always prevent a negative Net Residual Value. 
 
Consider exercising their call options to prevent the profusion of the 
collection account balance when the prepayment rate is more than the 
original expectation. 
 
Although the results will be useful for the risk management of MBS issuers, 
there are some limitations in the model, making further research necessary.  
The financial factor is only one of many aspects in the risk management of 
MBS.  Risk management is a widespread subject that involves operational 
risk and interest risk, etc., and we cannot only consider financial factors in 
the analysis.  When MBS issuers make a important decision, such as 
whether to exercise a call option, the decision involves the strategic position 
of the corporation rather than just the financial benefit.  Therefore, we 
should consider more factors when managing the risk of MBS portfolios.  
 
The model itself is flexible and can also be used to facilitate the risk pricing 
of MBS guarantors and investors.  Indeed, more types of MBS will be 
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